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When it comes to the expression and inculcation of religious doctrine, 
there can be no doubt that the messenger matters.1 
– Justice Samuel Alito 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court decided a case in which a 
seemingly unstoppable force was halted by a constitutionally immovable 
object.2  The case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School 
v. EEOC, involved a claim brought by fourth-grade teacher Cheryl Perich 
against her previous employer, a Lutheran school, seeking damages for her 
allegedly retaliatory termination under the terms of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.3  The case represented the first time that the 
constitutionality of the “ministerial exception”—a judge-made doctrine that 
precludes courts from deciding any employment discrimination claim 
brought against a religious organization by or on behalf of one of its 
ministers4—would be considered by the Supreme Court.5  The case also 
provided the long-awaited opportunity for the Court to answer the question 
that had plagued the circuit courts for over four decades: how and by whom 
should an employee’s “ministerial-status” be determined?6 
The Court managed simultaneously to bring clarity and confusion to the 
future of the ministerial exception.  While the constitutionality of such a 
doctrine—as well as its applicability to the case at hand—was agreed upon 
unanimously, the Court refused to establish any “rigid formula” for the 
future determination of one’s status as minister, instead relying solely on the 
specific circumstances presented in the case.7  Regardless of the means, 
however, the end result—that the First Amendment unequivocally protects a 
 
 1.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 713 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 2.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 3.  See id. at 699–701; see also discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 4.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705; see also discussion infra Parts II, III.A. 
 5.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–10; see also discussion infra Part III.A. 
 6.  See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 7.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707–08. 
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religious organization’s freedom to choose its ministers free from 
governmental intrusion—was indeed a victory for religious liberty.8   
In the light of another Supreme Court case, decided just two years 
earlier, this victory was very much needed.  In Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, the Court, in a 5–4 decision, upheld a university 
nondiscrimination policy that conditioned the availability of funding and 
facilities on a religious student group’s willingness to open up its 
membership and leadership positions to individuals whose beliefs were 
exactly opposite of the collective’s.9  The case sparked a fire that, in the two 
years following the decision, resulted in universities across the country 
denying dozens of religious student groups official recognition due to the 
groups’ unwillingness to give up control over their requirements for an 
individual to join and lead the collective.10  
The mixed messages these two cases send with regard to a religious 
group’s ability to choose its leadership are concerning.  How can a federally 
enacted piece of antidiscrimination legislation have less power over a 
religious organization’s right to choose its leadership than a university-
enacted nondiscrimination policy?  Surely the constitutional considerations 
underlying the ministerial exception would be just as applicable on a 
university campus as in an employment discrimination case, wouldn’t they? 
In light of the more recent Hosanna-Tabor decision, this Comment 
seeks to answer these questions by extending the reasoning behind the 
ministerial exception to the university context in order to build a foundation 
upon which a future exception can be built to ensure that religious student 
groups are sufficiently free to choose their own leaders.  Part II sets forth a 
brief history of the ministerial exception and its application in the circuit 
courts.11  Part III addresses two recent Supreme Court cases, Martinez and 
Hosanna-Tabor, and their practical effect on religious liberty, as well as the 
public’s perception of both cases.12  Part IV then offers observations and 
comparisons regarding antidiscrimination legislation and their university-
based counterparts and the parties affected by both, as well as a brief 
explanation of the lack of distinction between governmental imposition of 
 
 8.  See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 9.  130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); see discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 10.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 11.  See infra notes 16–52 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 50–134 and accompanying text. 
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monetary penalties and governmental withholding of benefits.13  Part V 
explores the hypothetical application of current case law regarding the 
ministerial exception to the relationship between a student-chapter president 
of Christian Legal Society—the party bringing suit in Martinez—and the 
organization on the whole.14 
II.  THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION PRIOR TO HOSANNA-TABOR 
The “ministerial exception” is a judicially created doctrine that serves to 
bridge the gap between the requirements of the U.S. Constitution and the 
mandates of modern antidiscrimination legislation.15  The ministerial 
exception is grounded in the First Amendment, which provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”16  The simultaneous constitutional 
protections of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
ensure that a religious group is free to determine its own faith and mission, 
unencumbered by any governmental interference in the ecclesiastical 
decisions of the group.17 
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII of which 
prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it made sure to carefully carve 
out an exception for religious institutions to avoid infringing on their First 
Amendment rights.18  Section 702 of Title VII exempts religious institutions 
from the requirements of Title VII with regard to “the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion,” thereby ensuring that religious 
institutions cannot be required to employ individuals whose fundamental 
 
 13.  See infra notes 132–202 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 204–40 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See generally Todd Cole, The Ministerial Exception: Resolving the Conflict Between Title 
VII and the First Amendment, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703 (2010). 
 16.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 17.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012) (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which 
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.  
According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also 
violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical 
decisions.”). 
 18.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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religious beliefs are at odds with those of the institution.19  Such a provision 
is intuitive, as most would agree that the Catholic Church is free to guard the 
tenets of its faith by precluding Protestant pastors from leading a Catholic 
Mass.  Still, this statutorily created exception only extends to employment 
discrimination based on religious belief and not on the basis of race, gender, 
or any other criteria prohibited by Title VII.20 
Soon after the enactment of Title VII, various circuit courts began 
taking independent steps to protect religious institutions from 
unconstitutional intervention by government agencies under Title VII.21  In 
1972, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals instituted a court-made exception 
separate from Section 702 of Title VII that expanded religious institutions’ 
discretion in hiring and firing “ministers.”22  The new exception was based 
on the understanding that “[t]he relationship between an organized church 
and its ministers is its lifeblood” and that “[m]atters touching this 
relationship [are] . . . of prime ecclesiastical concern.”23  In essence, this 
“ministerial exception,” as it has since been called, provides a jurisdictional 
bar to all discrimination claims brought against religious institutions by their 
ministers, even if the discrimination alleged by those ministers is based on 
race, gender, age, or any other category prohibited by Title VII or other 
antidiscrimination legislation.24 
 
 19.  See id. § 2000e-1(a). 
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens 
outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society of its activities. 
Id. 
 20.  See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 
1985) (“[R]eligious institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, [but] 
Title VII does not confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same decisions on the 
basis of race, sex, or national origin.” (citations omitted)). 
 21.  See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.  
 22.  McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 23.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 558–59. 
 24.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 
(2012) (“The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only 
when it is made for a religious reason.  The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and 
control who will minister to the faithful . . . is the church’s alone.” (citation omitted)); Hollins v. 
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The ministerial exception, a doctrine 
rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom, precludes subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its 
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Since its inception in the Fifth Circuit, the ministerial exception has 
been accepted and applied in each of the circuits except for the Federal 
Circuit.25  Though unanimously accepted,26 the ministerial exception has 
been applied under a variety of analyses, differing with regard to whether the 
employee bringing suit is a minister for purposes of the ministerial 
exception.27  Though each circuit employs its own unique and nuanced 
approach, a “role-based” and a “claim-based” approach have emerged as the 
two overarching forms of analysis employed by circuit courts to address this 
 
ministerial employees, based on the institution’s constitutional right to be free from judicial 
interference in the selection of those employees.”); see also  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701, 709–
10 (barring suit alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d. Cir. 2008) (barring suit alleging race discrimination); EEOC 
v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (barring suit alleging gender discrimination); 
Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (barring suit 
alleging both gender and race discrimination); McClure, 460 F.2d at 561 (“The order of the District 
Court sustaining The Salvation Army’s motion to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction is 
affirmed.” (emphasis added)). 
  The ministerial exception has also been applied to suits between a minister and his religious 
employer not based on employment discrimination.  Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater 
Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (barring suit based on a violation of the overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
  Furthermore, the exception “encompasses all tangible employment actions and disallows 
lawsuits for damages based on lost or reduced pay[,] . . . [as] [s]uch damages would necessarily 
trench on the Church’s protected ministerial decisions.”  Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of 
Seattle, 598 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (noting that a minister’s suit for damages against her religious 
employer was still prohibited by the ministerial exception). 
 25.  See, e.g., Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th 
Cir. 2010); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); 
McCants v. Ala.-West Fla. Conference of United Methodist Church, Inc., 372 F. App’x 39 (11th Cir. 
2010); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 
(3d Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Alicea-
Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of 
Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 
360 (8th Cir. 1991); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).  
 26.  As the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is limited to certain subject matters, such as intellectual 
property and government contracts, that are unrelated to the ministerial exception, the circuit’s 
failure to hear a case in which the ministerial exception is at issue does not detract from the 
unanimity under which the ministerial exception is accepted.  See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of 
the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(A)(1), 11 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 651, 653–55 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1295, 1296 (2012). 
 27.  See Cole, supra note 15, at 729–33. 
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question.28   
The role-based approach decides whether an employee is a minister by 
determining if the employee’s position is “important to the spiritual and 
pastoral mission of the church,” and not simply whether that employee 
possesses the formal title of “minister.”29  In order to lay out a more practical 
framework for determining the spiritual or pastoral importance of an 
employee’s position, courts applying the role-based approach look more 
specifically to whether an employee’s “duties consist of teaching, spreading 
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision 
or participation in religious ritual and worship.”30  If so, that employee is 
barred from bringing an employment discrimination claim against his or her 
religious employer.31  The breadth of the role-based approach is evidenced 
by the fact that a variety of employees have been deemed “ministers” for 
purposes of the ministerial exception—among them a non-ordained 
associate in pastoral care,32 music director and organist,33 manager of 
Hispanic communications,34 and associate professor of Canon Law at a 
Catholic university.35 
Those circuits that apply a claims-based approach look not to the role of 
the individual’s position within the religious institution, but to the nature of 
the claim brought against the religious institution.36  Under such an 
approach, the ministerial exception only applies to cases involving claims in 
which “resolution . . . would limit a religious institution’s right to choose 
who will perform particular spiritual functions.”37  This necessitates a 
 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. at 704 (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
“[T]he ministerial exception encompasses all employees of a religious institution, whether ordained 
or not, whose primary functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission.”  Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 
F.3d at 463.  
 30.  Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
 31.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 32.  Rayburn, 722 F.2d at 1165. 
 33.  Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006); see also EEOC v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000) (music director and 
part-time elementary school music teacher); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(choir director). 
 34.  Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 35.  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 36.  Cole, supra note 15, at 733. 
 37.  Id. (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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determination of whether the claim is based on religious “discipline, faith, 
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law, or whether it is a 
case in which [courts] should hold religious organizations liable in civil 
courts for purely secular disputes.”38  This approach thus allows a court to 
hear purely secular claims such as one of sexual harassment.39  However, if 
the religious institution claimed that the alleged harassment was based in or 
justified by the institution’s religious doctrine, then the court would 
ultimately be unable to hear the claim, as doing so would result in the court 
scrutinizing and second-guessing such doctrine in violation of the First 
Amendment.40 
Though not as prevalent or as divisive as the issue of an employee’s 
status as minister, there are also varying approaches to determining whether 
the employer is a religious institution—a necessary element of the 
ministerial exception.41  Generally speaking, whether an employer is a 
religious institution for purposes of the ministerial exception requires the 
same inquiry as whether the employer could be defined as “a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society” under Section 
702 of Title VII.42  The analysis used to determine the religious nature of the 
 
 38.  Id. (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 
2002) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 39.  See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 40.  See id.  
Elvig may, consistent with the First Amendment, attempt to show that she was sexually 
harassed and that this harassment created a hostile work environment.  This showing 
would, after all, involve a purely secular inquiry.  Assuming Elvig can prove a hostile 
work environment, the Church may nonetheless invoke First Amendment protection from 
Title VII liability if it claims that her subjection to or the Church’s toleration of sexual 
harassment was doctrinal.  We do not scrutinize doctrinal justifications because it is . . . 
not our role to determine whether the Church had a secular or religious reason for the 
alleged mistreatment of Elvig. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 41.  See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2010); LeBoon v. Lancaster 
Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007).  As the ministerial exception only protects the 
relationship between a religious institution and its ministers, the court must find that the institution is 
indeed “religious” in nature and that the employee in question was a minister of that religious 
institution.  Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 42.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).  Generally, the issue in cases applying the ministerial exception 
is not whether the employer is religious, but whether the employee is indeed a minister.  EEOC v. 
Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988).  This has resulted in minimal 
jurisprudence specifically analyzing both the religious nature of the institution and the employee’s 
status as minister for purposes of applying the ministerial exception to employment discrimination 
claims.  But see Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310–11 (4th 
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employer looks to whether the organization or institution is “primarily 
religious,” which would qualify the institution or organization for statutory 
exemption and, simultaneously, potential protection under the ministerial 
exception.43 
Two of the most recent cases involving such analysis were decided in 
the Third and Ninth Circuits, each utilizing a unique standard for 
determining whether the organizations at issue were indeed religious under 
Section 702 of Title VII.44  In LeBoon, a 2007 Third Circuit case, the court 
identified and relied on nine factors to determine whether the organization at 
issue was “primarily religious.”45  The court emphasized that all of these 
factors would not necessarily be considered in each case, nor would the 
weight of each factor remain constant from case to case, so as to ensure that 
the specific facts of each subsequent case would be adequately considered.46 
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit in Spencer rejected the LeBoon factors and 
instead used a different standard to determine if an organization was 
primarily religious.47  The Spencer court determined that an entity is 
“religious” for purposes of Title VII exemption:  
 
Cir. 2004) (finding that, for purposes of the ministerial exception’s application to the provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, a primarily Jewish home for the elderly was a religious institution and 
a mashgiach—an inspector appointed by a board of Orthodox rabbis to guard against any violation 
of the Jewish dietary laws—was a minister). 
  Thus, the most pertinent inquiry concerning the religiosity of the institution in employment 
discrimination suits relates directly to whether it would be exempted under Title VII from claims of 
religious discrimination.  Even jurisprudence relating to the Section 702 exemption is sparse, as “[i]n 
most cases, the organization seeking the exemption is ‘clearly’ religious, and the result is 
straightforward.”  Spencer, 633 F.3d at 726 (quoting Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d at 618). 
 43.  See Spencer, 633 F.3d at 729; LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226. 
 44.  See Spencer, 633 F.3d at 729; LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226. 
 45.  See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226.  The court acknowledged and applied the following factors for 
determining whether an organization is primarily religious: 
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it produces a secular product, (3) 
whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a 
religious purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with or financially supported by a 
formally religious entity such as a church or synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious 
entity participates in the management, for instance by having representatives on the board 
of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds itself out to the public as secular or sectarian, (7) 
whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its activities, (8) 
whether it includes religious instruction in its curriculum, to the extent it is an educational 
institution, and (9) whether its membership is made up by coreligionists. 
Id. 
 46.  Id. at 227. 
 47.  See Spencer, 633 F.3d at 734. 
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[I]f it is organized for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily in 
carrying out that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as 
an entity for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not 
engage primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods or 
services for money beyond nominal amounts.48 
In coming to its conclusion, the court explicitly rejected the contention that 
the statutory exemption only applied to “churches, synagogues, and the like” 
and instead expanded the application to “some religious corporations, 
associations, and societies that are not churches.”49 
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, the aforementioned principles governed the 
application of the ministerial exception.  The circuit courts were split 
regarding how to determine an institution’s “ministers” and a non-church’s 
status as a religious institution.   The muddled state of the ministerial 
exception’s application at the time of Hosanna-Tabor begged for Supreme 
Court clarity and guidance.  Unfortunately, such judicial direction would not 
be had. 
III.  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY TODAY 
A.  Hosanna-Tabor and Its Contributions to the Ministerial Exception 
On March 28, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear, for 
the first time, a case concerning the ministerial exception: Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.50  In the months between 
the grant of certiorari and the eventual issuance of the opinion on January 
11, 2012,51 law reviews across the nation published articles predicting the 
Supreme Court’s decision, most of which concluded that the ministerial 
exception would be greatly limited and that surely the plaintiff—an 
elementary teacher at a Lutheran school—could not be considered a minister 
under any standard.52  Each of the nine Supreme Court justices, however, 
 
 48.  Id. at 724. 
 49.  Id. at 728 & n.4. 
 50.  131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011). 
 51.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 52.  See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96, 97–98 (2011).  Corbin’s introduction alone 
illustrates her views of the case: 
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concluded otherwise.53 
1.  The Facts 
Hosanna-Tabor involved an employment dispute between Cheryl Perich 
and her employer, the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School, a member congregation of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.54  
Perich began working at the school in 1999 as a “lay” teacher—a position 
based on a year-to-year contract with no requirements concerning the 
employee’s religious background or training.55  A year after beginning work 
at the school and after completing a colloquy program at a Lutheran 
university,56 Hosanna-Tabor offered Perich the opportunity to become a 
 
According to the lower courts, interfering with clergy employment decisions would 
undermine the church autonomy guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.  Furthermore, 
they fear that these suits would lead to entanglement with religious doctrine and therefore 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
 They are mistaken.  Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause 
necessitates the ministerial exception.  As a neutral law of general applicability, the ADA 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.  Furthermore, trying to discern whether or not 
Perich is a minister creates more Establishment Clause problems than simply resolving 
her retaliation claim. 
Id; see also Brad Turner, It’s My Church and I Can Retaliate If I Want To: Hosanna-Tabor and the 
Future of the Ministerial Exception, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 21, 21–22 (2011).  
Like Corbin’s, Turner’s introduction expressly predicted exactly the opposite of what the Court 
would eventually hold: 
 Imagine a world in which a parochial school teacher can be fired for reporting the sexual 
abuse of a child to the government.  Now imagine that teacher cannot seek legal recourse 
because a so-called “ministerial exception” immunizes religious employers against 
lawsuits brought by their employees.  Depending on how the Supreme Court rules in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, that hypothetical world could become ours. 
. . . . 
 This commentary will examine Hosanna-Tabor in all its complexity.  After providing 
the factual and legal background, addressing the appellate court’s decision, and 
examining the arguments before the Supreme Court, the commentary will return to the 
previously posed hypothetical.  This commentary will then conclude that, fortunately for 
parochial school teachers, such a hypothetical world is, at least for now, probably only 
hypothetical. 
Turner, supra, at 21–22. 
 53.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 
(2012). 
 54.  Id. at 699–700. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  This colloquy program consisted of taking eight courses of theological study, obtaining the 
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“called” teacher.57  Though her teaching responsibilities did not change,58 
Perich was then considered “called to [her] vocation by God through a 
congregation.”59  Along with her “call,” Perich received the formal title of 
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned” and an open-ended term of 
employment that could only be rescinded for cause and by a supermajority 
vote of the Hosanna-Tabor congregation.60 
As a called teacher, Perich taught math, language arts, social studies, 
science, gym, art, and music to elementary-age children.61  She was also 
required to teach a religion class four days a week, and she led prayers and 
religious devotions each day during her time at Hosanna-Tabor.62  She also 
attended a weekly school-wide chapel service and, on a bi-yearly basis, led 
the chapel service herself.63  
Near the beginning of the 2004–2005 school year, Perich was absent 
from her teaching position at the school for a substantial amount of time due 
to an illness that was eventually diagnosed as narcolepsy.64  In January 2005, 
Perich informed the school’s principal, Stacey Hoeft, that she would be able 
to return to work in February as her symptoms were under control.65  Hoeft 
then told Perich that the school had filled her position with a lay teacher for 
the remainder of the school year and expressed concern that Perich was not 
yet able to return to the classroom.66 
Three days after the conversation between Perich and Hoeft, the 
congregation of Hosanna-Tabor met to discuss Perich’s future, concluding 
that she “was unlikely to be physically capable of returning to work that 
school year or the next.”67  The congregation decided that it should “offer 
Perich a “peaceful release from her call, whereby the congregation would 
 
endorsement of the Missouri Synod, and passing an oral examination of Hosanna-Tabor’s faculty 
committee.  Id. at 699. 
 57.  Id. at 700. 
 58.  Id. (“[T]eachers at the school generally performed the same duties regardless of whether 
they were lay or called . . . .”). 
 59.  Id. at 699. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 700. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
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pay a portion of [Perich’s] health insurance” on condition that she resign.68  
However, Perich refused to resign and, instead, appeared at the school a few 
weeks later and ignored Hoeft’s request that she leave school grounds.69  
Perich’s actions and her subsequent threat of litigation prompted Hosanna-
Tabor to officially terminate Perich, which ultimately led to Perich filing a 
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that 
she was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.70   
2.  The Opinions 
The Supreme Court decided unanimously that the First Amendment 
indeed forbids courts from hearing employment discrimination claims 
brought against religious employers by their ministers.71  And, more 
pertinent to the resolution of the case, such unanimity extended to the 
Court’s finding that Perich was indeed a minister for purposes of the 
ministerial exception.72  The way in which one’s status as a minister should 
be determined, however, posed a question that could not—or simply would 
not—be answered with the same kind of clarity. 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, clearly expressed intent to 
refrain from establishing any sort of “rigid formula” for determining a 
person’s status as a minister, and instead concluded that the totality of the 
circumstances of Perich’s employment made her such.73  The circumstances 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 700–01. 
 71.  See id. at 710.  Chief Justice Roberts succinctly laid out this understanding as follows: 
 The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, 
challenging her church’s decision to fire her.  Today we hold only that the ministerial 
exception bars such a suit . . . .  
 The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is 
undoubtedly important.  But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who 
will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.  When a minister 
who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the 
First Amendment has struck the balance for us.  The church must be free to choose those 
who will guide it on its way. 
Id. 
 72.  Id. at 708. 
 73.  Id. at 707. (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.  It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the 
ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her 
employment.”). 
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to which the Court ascribed particular significance were Perich’s formal 
title, “the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the 
important religious functions [Perich] performed.”74  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court also pointed out the errors in the Sixth Circuit’s 
finding that Perich was not a minister, namely the court’s failure to place 
any weight on Perich’s title, its decision to place too much weight on the fact 
that lay teachers performed the same functions as Perich, and the improper 
emphasis the court put on the secular duties that Perich also performed.75 
Though they agreed with the result reached by the majority, both Justice 
Alito76 and Justice Thomas filed separate concurrences where they set forth 
 
 74.  Id. at 708.  More particularly, Perich’s title of “commissioned minister” reflected the six 
years of training, education, and testing, along with a formidable application process, required to 
become a called teacher.  Id. at 707.  As to Perich’s own use of her title, the Court relied on the fact 
that she gladly accepted such a formal call to religious service, she repeatedly referred to her 
position as part of her “teaching ministry,” and she even claimed a housing allowance on her taxes 
available only to employees who earned their compensation “in the exercise of the ministry.”  Id. at 
707–08.  As to the important religious functions that Perich performed, the Court noted the fact that 
she taught her students religion four days a week, led prayer three times a day, and took her students 
to a school-wide chapel service each week.  Id. at 708.   
 75.  See id. at 708–09. The Court stated the following to clarify its decision: 
 First, the Sixth Circuit failed to see any relevance in the fact that Perich was a 
commissioned minister.  Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure 
coverage, the fact that an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is 
surely relevant, as is the fact that significant religious training and a recognized religious 
mission underlie the description of the employee’s position . . . . 
 Second, the Sixth Circuit gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the 
school performed the same religious duties as Perich.  We express no view on whether 
someone with Perich’s duties would be covered by the ministerial exception in the 
absence of the other considerations we have discussed.  But though relevant, it cannot be 
dispositive that others not formally recognized as ministers by the church perform the 
same functions—particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned 
ministers were unavailable. 
 Third, the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Perich’s performance of secular 
duties.  It is true that her religious duties consumed only 45 minutes of each workday, and 
that the rest of her day was devoted to teaching secular subjects.  The EEOC regards that 
as conclusive, contending that any ministerial exception “should be limited to those 
employees who perform exclusively religious functions.”  We cannot accept that view.  
Indeed, we are unsure whether any such employees exist.  The heads of congregations 
themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping to manage 
the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and overseeing the 
upkeep of facilities. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 76.  Justice Kagan joined in Justice Alito’s concurrence.  Id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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their views on how courts should determine one’s status as a “minister.”77  
Based on the fact that the ordination process of ministers, or even the use of 
the term “minister,” differs greatly between religions, Justice Alito asserted 
that the determination of an employee’s status as minister within a religious 
institution should be based solely on that employee’s function within that 
particular religious body.78  Thus, such an approach would look not at an 
employee’s title, but whether the employee is essential in carrying out those 
operations of a religious body that are constitutionally protected—leading 
the organization; conducting worship services, religious ceremonies, or 
rituals; or communicating, as a messenger or a teacher, the tenets and beliefs 
of the religious body.79  This objective focus on the function of a particular 
 
 77.  See id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 711–14 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 78.  See id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 The term “minister” is commonly used by many Protestant denominations to refer to 
members of their clergy, but the term is rarely if ever used in this way by Catholics, Jews, 
Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists.  In addition, the concept of ordination as understood by 
most Christian churches and by Judaism has no clear counterpart in some Christian 
denominations and some other religions.  Because virtually every religion in the world is 
represented in the population of the United States, it would be a mistake if the term 
“minister” or the concept of ordination were viewed as central to the important issue of 
religious autonomy that is presented in cases like this one.  Instead, courts should focus 
on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies. 
Id. 
 79.  Id. at 711–12.  Justice Alito’s concurrence, in pertinent part, argued the following: 
 The First Amendment protects the freedom of religious groups to engage in certain key 
religious activities, including the conducting of worship services and other religious 
ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical process of communicating the faith.  
Accordingly, religious groups must be free to choose the personnel who are essential to 
the performance of these functions. 
 The “ministerial” exception should be tailored to this purpose.  It should apply to any 
“employee” who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important 
religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.  If a 
religious group believes that the ability of such an employee to perform these key 
functions has been compromised, then the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom 
protects the group’s right to remove the employee from his or her position. 
Id.  The focus on an employee’s function over his title recognizes the fact that the validity and 
credibility of a particular religious body’s doctrine—whether regarding moral conduct or 
metaphysical truth—relates directly to the character and conduct of any employee charged with 
disseminating such doctrine to others, not just those employees labeled a “minister” by the religious 
body itself.  See id. at 713.  As Justice Alito succinctly asserts, “A religion cannot depend on 
someone to be an effective advocate for its religious vision if that person’s conduct fails to live up to 
the religious precepts that he or she espouses.”  Id.  Justice Alito’s approach closely resembles the 
“role-based” approach that many of the circuit courts employed.  See supra notes 28–35 and 
accompanying text. 
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employee within the religious body would, in Justice Alito’s opinion, 
provide the court with a means of determining the applicability of the 
ministerial exception to an employee of any religious body regardless of its 
beliefs and without detracting from a religious body’s constitutionally 
protected autonomy.80  Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, advocated for an 
approach that would require a court to give deference to a religious body’s 
understanding of who qualifies as its ministers—an approach that rests on 
the understanding that any judicial determination of an employee’s status as 
a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception is itself a violation of the 
autonomy afforded religious bodies by the First Amendment.81   
Though the decision was unanimous, Hosanna-Tabor provides very 
little clarity regarding how courts should apply the ministerial exception.82  
 
 80.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711–13.  The relevant language of the concurrence is as 
follows: 
 Religious autonomy means that religious authorities must be free to determine who is 
qualified to serve in positions of substantial religious importance.  Different religions will 
have different views on exactly what qualifies as an important religious position, but it is 
nonetheless possible to identify a general category of “employees” whose functions are 
essential to the independence of practically all religious groups.  These include those who 
serve in positions of leadership, those who perform important functions in worship 
services and in the performance of religious ceremonies and rituals, and those who are 
entrusted with teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation. 
 Applying the protection of the First Amendment to roles of religious leadership, 
worship, ritual, and expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for 
the autonomy of any religious group, regardless of its beliefs. 
Id. at 712. 
 81.  Id. at 710.  Justice Thomas communicated his view as follows: 
[I]n my view, the Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception 
and to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its 
minister.  As the Court explains, the Religion Clauses guarantee religious organizations 
autonomy in matters of internal governance, including the selection of those who will 
minister the faith.  A religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be 
hollow, however, if secular courts could second-guess the organization’s sincere 
determination that a given employee is a “minister” under the organization’s theological 
tenets. 
Id. 
 82.  See Lauren N. Woleslagle, The United States Supreme Court Sanctifies the Ministerial 
Exception in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC Without Addressing Who Is a Minister: A Blessing for 
Religious Freedom or Is the Line Between Church and State Still Blurred?, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 895, 
912–13 (2012).  
 While the decision clearly indicates that the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
protect churches’ religious freedom to hire and fire their ministerial employees by 
forbidding governments from second-guessing religious communities’ decisions about 
who should be their teachers, leaders, and ministers, the Court played it safe by limiting 
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The majority’s refusal to establish any sort of “rigid formula” and its 
reliance on an analysis based entirely on the unique combination of facts and 
circumstances present in Hosanna-Tabor only provides judicial guidance to 
future cases factually and circumstantially identical to Hosanna-Tabor.83  
Furthermore, Justice Alito’s concurrence lends credence to the role-based 
approach employed by many circuit courts while Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence seems to introduce an entirely new approach to the ministerial 
exception.84  Regardless of the Justices’ varying approaches to the 
ministerial exception, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor reinforced the 
long-understood idea that a religious institution is to be free from 
governmental intrusion into the selection of its “ministers”85—a 
classification that seemingly extends far beyond formal titles and 
ordination.86  
B.  The All-Comers Policy of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
Less than two years before the Supreme Court issued its unanimous 
ruling in Hosanna-Tabor, another case involving the relationship between 
church and state sent shockwaves through the legal community.  Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez, a case concerning the institution of a non-
discrimination policy at a state university and its preclusive effect on 
religious student organizations, resulted in a 5–4 split decision upholding the 
policy, giving state universities the judicial blessing to withhold official 
recognition from religious student organizations that operate in a 
discriminatory manner due to their religious beliefs.87  
 
its holding to the facts presented in this particular case. 
 The Court’s analysis will be perfect if all future employment discrimination lawsuits 
brought against a religious organization involve an employee with the same job functions 
as Cheryl Perich.  In reality, that will not happen.  Inevitably, lower courts will be faced 
with determining whether a certain employee, other than a minister, qualifies for 
purposes of applying the ministerial exception.  The Hosanna-Tabor decision, however, 
does not provide the guidance needed to determine this issue.  
Id. 
 83.  See id. 
 84.  See infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
 85.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706–07.  
 86.   See id. at 707–09. 
 87.  130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
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1.  The Facts 
In September 2004, a group of students partnered with the national 
organization Christian Legal Society88 (CLS) and applied to become a 
Recognized Student Organization (RSO) of Hastings School of Law.89  After 
reviewing the bylaws of CLS, which included the mandate that all members 
and officers sign a “Statement of Faith,”90 the school denied RSO status to 
the CLS group because the CLS bylaws violated Hastings’s 
nondiscrimination policy as they necessarily discriminated against anyone 
whose religious beliefs did not align with the CLS Statement of Faith.91  The 
 
 88.  The Christian Legal Society “is a non-denominational Christian membership association of 
lawyers, judges, law professors, law students, and other associates (friends of CLS who do not have 
a law degree) whose members participate in the broad and rich variety of Christian congregational 
life and traditions.”  Statement of Faith, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page. 
aspx?pid=367 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).  The organization’s mission statement asserts the 
following: 
The mission of the Christian Legal Society is to inspire, encourage, and equip Christian 
lawyers and law students both individually and in community to proclaim, love and serve 
Jesus Christ through the study and practice of law, the provision of legal assistance to the 
poor and needy, and the defense of the inalienable rights to life and religious freedom. 
Vision & Mission Statement, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=820 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 89.  See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.  When a student organization is given RSO status, that 
group becomes eligible to seek financial assistance from Hastings, such funds coming from the 
mandatory student-activity fee imposed on all students.  Id. at 2979.  An RSO can also communicate 
with students via “[l]aw-[s]chool channels,” which includes placing announcements in the student 
newsletter, posting advertisements on bulletin boards, participating in the yearly Student 
Organizations Fair held on-campus, and sending emails to the entire student population through a 
Hastings email address system.  Id.  
 90.  The “Statement of Faith” is as follows:  
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: 
• One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
• God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. 
• The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, 
born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive 
eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return. 
• The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. 
• The Bible as the inspired Word of God. 
Id. at 2980 n.3; see also Statement of Faith, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/ 
page.aspx?pid=367 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 91.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.  More specifically, the Court determined that signing the 
Statement of Faith as a condition to membership and candidacy for office excluded those students 
who held religious convictions different than those embodied in the Statement of Faith.  Id.  
Furthermore, the Court found that each member, when signing the statement, pledged to “conduct 
their lives in accord with prescribed principles,” which included the belief that sexual activity should 
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discrimination policy applied to all groups associated with Hastings, 
including RSOs, and prohibited any illegal discrimination based on “race, 
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual 
orientation.”92  When CLS’s request for an exemption from Hastings’s 
policy was denied, the organization chose to operate independently from the 
school as it refused to change its bylaws to comply with Hastings’s 
policies.93  A month after being denied RSO status, CLS filed suit against 
Hastings alleging that its nondiscrimination policy infringed upon the 
organization’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.94 
2.  The Majority Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, found that the 
nondiscrimination policy employed by Hastings School of Law did not 
violate CLS’s constitutional rights—the right to expressive association, free 
exercise of religion, or free speech.95  While the Court’s analysis of CLS’s 
free-exercise argument was limited to a mere endnote,96 the issue of whether 
 
take place only in the context of a marriage between one man and one woman; thus the bylaws 
excluded CLS’s affiliation with anyone engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct”—a stance 
that, in the Court’s view, amounted to discrimination based on sexual orientation.  See id. at 2980, 
2989–90; id. at 2998 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 92.  Id. at 2979. 
 93.  Id. at 2981.  As a part of its independent operation, “CLS held weekly Bible-study meetings 
and invited Hastings students to Good Friday and Easter Sunday church services.”  Id.  It also hosted 
a campus lecture on the Christian faith as well as various social events including a beach barbecue 
and a Thanksgiving dinner.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 2981, 2995 & n.27. 
 96.  Id. at 2995 n.27.  The majority’s brief response to CLS’s free-exercise argument was as 
follows: 
CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition violates the Free Exercise Clause.  
Our decision in Smith forecloses that argument.  In Smith, the Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid regulations of general 
application that incidentally burden religious conduct.  In seeking an exemption from 
Hastings’ across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS, we repeat, seeks preferential, not 
equal, treatment; it therefore cannot moor its request for accommodation to the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 878–82 (1990)).  The Court also noted the Ninth Circuit’s finding that “CLS may be motivated 
by its religious beliefs to exclude students based on their religion or sexual orientation, . . . but that 
does not convert the reason for Hastings’ [Nondiscrimination Policy] to be one that is religiously-
based.”  Id. at 2981 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (brackets in original).  
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Hastings’s policy infringed upon CLS’s right to expressive association and 
free speech required a much more in-depth inquiry. 
The Court made a pivotal preliminary decision when it refused to 
analyze Hastings’s policy as written and instead analyzed the policy as 
applied, which resembled an “all-comers policy”—a policy that mandates 
that all students have access to all student groups associated with Hastings.97  
In determining the proper level of scrutiny to apply to Hastings’s all-comers 
policy in light of its effect on CLS’s rights to both free speech and 
expressive association, the Court decided that the application of two 
different standards would be “anomalous” and that the Court’s “limited-
public-forum” line of precedent supplied the proper analytical framework.98  
 
 97.  Id. at 2982–84.  At the summary-judgment stage of trial in the district court, CLS and 
Hastings submitted a joint stipulation of facts which read as follows: 
Hastings requires that registered student organizations allow any student to participate, 
become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] 
status or beliefs.  Thus, for example, the Hastings Democratic Caucus cannot bar students 
holding Republican political beliefs from becoming members or seeking leadership 
positions in the organization. 
Id. at 2982.  Because CLS willingly agreed to such a stipulation and both the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit adjudicated the case upon such an agreement, the Court rejected “CLS’s unseemly 
attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift its target to Hastings’ policy as written” and thus 
considered “only whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with 
an all-comers policy violates the Constitution.”  Id. at 2984. 
 98.  Id. at 2985–86.  Historically, the limited-public-forum analysis applied only to situations in 
which a governmental entity placed limitations on speech in order to regulate property in its charge.  
Id. at 2984.  Such limitations would be permissible as long as they were both reasonable and 
viewpoint-neutral.  Id.  On the other hand, laws and regulations that in some way constrained 
associational freedom were “rigorously reviewed,” id. at 2984–85, and only upheld if such 
regulations served “compelling state interests” that “[could not] be advanced through . . . 
significantly less restrictive [means]” and were “unrelated to the suppression of ideas.”  Id. at 2985 
(citations and internal quotations omitted) (some alterations in original).  Though the all-comers 
policy indeed constrained CLS’s associational freedom, the Court chose to refrain from employing 
the rigorous review generally reserved for such constraints, instead looking solely to the policy’s 
reasonability and viewpoint-neutrality, for the following three reasons.  Id. 
  First, the Court determined that the considerations that allow for less-restrictive review of 
limitations on speech in a limited public forum equally apply to constraints on associational freedom 
in such forums.  Id.  Based on the understanding that “speech and expressive-association rights are 
closely linked,” the Court reasoned that “it would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive 
constitutional review under [a] limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an impermissible 
infringement of expressive association.”  Id. 
   Second, the Court determined that the application of strict scrutiny review of associational 
constraint would inherently invalidate the very purpose of the limited public forum—allowing a 
public university to “confin[e] a [speech] forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it 
was created.”  Id. at 2986 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
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Under such a framework, the all-comers policy’s constitutionality would 
hinge on whether it was both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.99 
With the framework of the pertinent analysis established, the Court then 
determined that, in light of a public university’s interest in fostering an 
inclusive and tolerant educational atmosphere, the policy under which 
Hastings denied CLS RSO status was indeed reasonable.100  This conclusion 
was based also on the fact that CLS’s lack of RSO status did not preclude it 
from operating as a student group independent from Hastings.101  
 
829 (1995)) (alterations in original). 
  Third, the Court placed great weight on the fact that the all-comers policy placed only 
“indirect pressure” on CLS with regard to its membership policies.  Id.  In the majority’s opinion, the 
policy did not directly compel CLS to associate with unwanted persons, but rather gave CLS the 
option to amend its bylaws and receive the benefits of being an RSO or refuse and simply operate as 
an independent student group without any sort of subsidy or institutional help.  Id.  The distinction 
between a policy that requires action and one that simply withholds benefits further solidified the 
Court’s understanding that its limited-public-forum line of precedent was proper.  Id.  
 99.  Id. at 2984. 
 100.  Id. at 2988–91.  Giving appropriate deference to the decisions of the Hastings 
administration, the Court relied on four main considerations in determining that the “all-comers 
policy” was, indeed, reasonable.  Id.  First, the Court acknowledged the reasonable understanding of 
the School that the “educational experience is best promoted when all participants in the forum must 
provide equal access to all students” ensuring that “no Hastings student [through payment of the 
mandatory student-activity fees] is forced to fund a group that would reject her as a member.”  Id. at 
2989.   
  Second, the all-comers policy allowed Hastings to ensure that no discriminatory practices 
were being allowed without having to determine the motivation behind any such discrimination.  Id.  
This finding rejected CLS’s contention that the policy should only prohibit status-based 
discrimination as opposed to belief-based discrimination.  Id. at 2990.  Such distinction, in the 
Court’s view, would prove difficult to determine and would “impose on Hastings [the] daunting 
labor” of separating permissible discrimination from the impermissible.  Id.  As such, the across-the-
board application of the policy was, at least, reasonable.  Id. 
  Third, the Court viewed as reasonable Hastings’s belief that the inclusive effect of the all-
comers policy “encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students” when effectuated 
peacefully and provides opportunities to develop “conflict-resolution skills, toleration, and readiness 
to find common ground” in those instances where the policy produces discord.  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  
  Lastly, the fact that Hastings’s policy “subsume[d]” California’s own laws pertaining to 
discrimination further lent credence to the Court’s finding that the policy was indeed reasonable.  Id. 
at 2990–91. 
 101.  Id. at 2991–92.  As the applicability and effect of the all-comers policy was viewpoint 
neutral in the opinion of the Court, the Court gave further blessing to Hastings’s policy by weighing 
the alternative means of communication available to CLS.  Id. at 2991.  The fact that Hastings 
allowed CLS access to classrooms for meetings and chalkboards for advertising events, coupled with 
CLS’s access to social-networking sites and a Yahoo! message group, led the Court to determine that 
the barrier of the all-comers policy to CLS’s free-speech rights was not unreasonable.  Id. 
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Furthermore, the fact that each and every organization was required to 
accept each and every student—thus prohibiting discrimination on any 
basis—led to the determination that the policy was inherently viewpoint-
neutral.102  As such, in the majority’s opinion, the all-comers policy 
employed by Hastings infringed neither on CLS’s right to free speech nor its 
right to expressive association.103  
3.  The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Alito’s dissent—in which Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas 
joined—began by “correcting the picture” that the majority previously 
painted.104  First, the dissent pointed out that the all-comers policy that 
survived the constitutional analysis of the majority was, in fact, not the 
policy in effect at the time CLS was denied RSO status; rather, Hastings 
applied its Nondiscrimination Policy, not the “belatedly unveiled” all-
comers policy, when it denied RSO status to CLS.105  The dissent further 
attempted to correct the majority’s allegedly inaccurate portrayal of the 
hardship CLS experienced due to the denial of its RSO application.106  
According to the dissent, Hastings’s offer to grant CLS access to its facilities 
was, in reality, without practical substance, as any attempt made by CLS to 
 
 102.  Id. at 2993–94.  In the words of the Court, it was “hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral 
policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.”  Id. at 2993.  Furthermore, the 
Court rejected CLS’s contention that though the policy was admitted to be “nominally neutral,” it 
was constitutionally impermissible as “it systematically and predictably burden[ed] most heavily 
those groups whose viewpoints [were] out of favor with the campus mainstream.”  Id. at 2994 
(citation and internal quotations omitted).  In doing so, the Court reiterated the fact that “‘[a] 
regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it 
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.’”  Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (alteration in original). 
 103.  Id. at 2995. 
 104.  Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 105.  Id. at 3001, 3003–06 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Though the events that gave rise to the litigation 
occurred in 2004, the all-comers policy on which the majority focused its analysis was, in the 
dissent’s opinion, not mentioned—much less in effect—until July 2005 when the Dean of Hastings 
was deposed.  Id. at 3001, 3003–04.  Furthermore, regardless of the fact that CLS had acknowledged 
the all-comers policy in the Joint Stipulation that was so heavily relied on by the majority, the 
dissent argued that the acknowledgement of Hastings’s policy at the time of the Joint Stipulation did 
not preclude CLS from asserting that the policy leading to the denial of its RSO status—the 
Nondiscrimination Policy—was unconstitutional.  Id. at 3005.   
 106.  Id. at 3006. 
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take advantage of such access was largely ignored.107 
Having sufficiently corrected the factual premises upon which the case 
was based, the dissent began to analyze the relevant legal issues.108  First, the 
dissent likened the factual scenario at hand to that in Healy v. James109—a 
case that the majority had deemed irrelevant to its analysis—asserting that 
Healy’s reasoning applied just as forcefully to the situation at Hastings.110  In 
light of such precedent, the dissent found that the denial of CLS’s RSO 
 
 107.  Id.  The president of CLS allegedly made such an attempt in August of 2005, requesting 
permission from Hastings to set up an “advice table” on a campus patio to meet and speak with 
students.  Id.  Despite the time-sensitive nature of the request, CLS received no response until long 
after the date sought in the request, and Hastings’s response was accompanied by an instruction that 
CLS only contact the school administration through CLS’s attorney.  Id.  CLS’s attorney made a 
second attempt a month later when he, per Hastings’s instruction, contacted the school’s 
administration to reserve a room so CLS could bring a guest speaker to campus to address interested 
students; again, Hastings failed to respond until after the date of the proposed event.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 3007–20. 
 109.  408 U.S. 169 (1972).  
 110.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3007–08 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Healy was a case in which a public 
college refused to recognize the local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) as a 
student group associated with the college.  408 U.S. at 187.  There, SDS’s national reputation for 
violence led the school administration to refuse official recognition due to the understanding that the 
philosophy of SDS was “antithetical to the school’s policies.”  Id. at 174–75.  As a result, SDS 
suffered the denial of access to school facilities as well as the customary means used for 
communication among the student population.  Id. at 176, 181–82.  When SDS’s claim that the 
college had acted unconstitutionally came before the Supreme Court, the Court ruled that the 
burdens to SDS’s freedom of association—namely the lack of access to the campus facilities and 
normal means of communication—were sufficient to deem the college’s actions unconstitutional, 
despite the fact that SDS could still conduct their associational business off-campus.  Id. at 181–83.  
Furthermore, the Court gave no deference to the school administrator’s reasoning behind precluding 
SDS from operating as a recognized group, as the Healy Court rejected the idea that “First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at 
large.”  Id. at 180. 
  The dissent in Martinez took an approach similar to that of the Court in Healy.  First, the 
dissent pointed out the similarities between the burdens placed on CLS and SDS—lack of access to 
campus facilities and normative means of community-wide communication—and argued that the 
added issue of school funding in the CLS case should not justify straying from Healy’s precedent.  
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3008 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Second, the dissent insisted that the majority’s 
high deference to Hastings’s reasoning for denying CLS RSO status was exactly opposite to the 
approach in Healy and thus, unwarranted.  Id.  Instead, the dissent asserted “that when it comes to 
the interpretation and application of the right to free speech, we exercise our own independent 
judgment[;] [w]e do not defer to Congress on such matters, and there is no reason why we should 
bow to university administrators.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  To the dissent, if the college’s 
views regarding the philosophy of SDS in Healy could not justify the denial of SDS’s First 
Amendment rights, neither could Hastings’s disapproval of CLS’s membership and leadership 
requirements.  Id. at 3008–09. 
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status was constitutionally impermissible regardless of the level of alleged 
access it had to Hastings’s facilities thereafter.111 
For the sake of argument, the dissent then engaged in its own 
application of the limited-public-forum line of cases to Hastings’s 
Nondiscrimination Policy.112  The viewpoint-neutrality prong of the analysis 
proved to be, in the dissent’s opinion, the downfall of the Nondiscrimination 
Policy—due to the fact that student groups were consistently allowed to 
discriminate against others so long as the reason was not religiously based.113 
In order to sufficiently challenge the majority, the dissent even 
addressed the constitutionality of the all-comers policy, despite the 
understanding that such policy was not in effect when CLS applied to the 
RSO program.114  Focusing on the expressive-association purposes of the 
RSO program as a limited public forum, the dissent argued that the all-
comers policy was not reasonable because it stifled the diversity of 
viewpoints that the program was designed to create.115  The dissent further 
 
 111.  Id. 3007–08; see also id. at 3006 (“This Court does not customarily brush aside a claim of 
unlawful discrimination with the observation that the effects of the discrimination were really not so 
bad.  We have never before taken the view that a little viewpoint discrimination is acceptable.”). 
 112.  Id. at 3009 (“While I think that Healy is largely controlling, I am content to address the 
constitutionality of Hastings’ actions under our limited public forum cases, which lead to exactly the 
same conclusion.”). 
 113.  Id. at 3010–12 .  The dissent sharply highlighted the lack of viewpoint neutrality: 
As Hastings stated in its answer, the Nondiscrimination Policy “permit[ted] political, 
social, and cultural student organizations to select officers and members who are 
dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs.”  But the policy singled out one category 
of expressive associations for disfavored treatment: groups formed to express a religious 
message.  Only religious groups were required to admit students who did not share their 
views.  An environmentalist group was not required to admit students who rejected global 
warming.  An animal rights group was not obligated to accept students who supported the 
use of animals to test cosmetics.  But CLS was required to admit avowed atheists.  This 
was patent viewpoint discrimination . . . .  It is no wonder that the Court makes no 
attempt to defend the constitutionality of the Nondiscrimination Policy. 
Id. at 3010 (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original). 
 114.  Id. at 3013–20. 
 115.  Id. at 3013–15.  Quoting the joint stipulation offered by both CLS and Hastings, the dissent 
points out the fact that the RSO program was created to “promote a diversity of viewpoints among 
registered student organizations, including viewpoints on religion and human sexuality.”  Id. at 3013 
(internal quotations omitted).  Furthermore, the development of the RSO forum over time evidenced 
such purposes, as each of the RSOs was free to assert and operate under “its own independently 
devised purpose”—and many RSOs promulgated a specific viewpoint about a certain subject rather 
than aspiring to neutrality about that particular subject.  Id. at 3013–14.  As an example, the dissent 
noted that there was no “Party Politics Club” at Hastings; rather, there was both the “Hastings 
Democratic Caucus” and the “Hastings Republicans.”  Id. at 3014. 
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questioned the majority’s finding of viewpoint neutrality in light of evidence 
that the all-comers policy was belatedly announced by Hastings as a pretext 
for engaging in viewpoint discrimination against organizations like CLS.116 
Because of the perceived inadequacy of the majority’s reasoning, the 
dissent labeled the majority’s decision “a serious setback for freedom of 
expression.”117  The dissent, along with multiple amici, recognized the 
practical effect that upholding Hastings’s policy would likely have in the 
future: religiously based student groups at public universities across the 
country could be forced to choose between adhering to their deeply held 
beliefs at the expense of their ability to fully function as a recognized student 
group and laying down such beliefs to avoid potentially crippling burdens.118 
 
  In the dissent’s view, the institution of an “all-comers policy” inherently stifled the expansion 
of a diversity of viewpoints within the RSO program as it restricted the ability of students to express, 
through the creation of a new student group, any viewpoint contrary to the viewpoint embodied by 
the all-comers policy.  Id. at 3014–15.  Thus, the dissent determined that the policy was “not 
reasonable in light of the stipulated purpose of the RSO forum: to promote a diversity of viewpoints 
‘among’—not within—‘registered student organizations.’”  Id. at 3016 (citation omitted). 
 116.  Id. at 3016–19.  Such evidence mainly related to the shifting policies of Hastings with regard 
to anti-discriminatory measures, the non-enforcement of the all-comers policy prior to CLS’s 
application, the timing of the official announcement of the policy in relation to the litigation between 
CLS and Hastings, and the lack of documentation of any all-comers policy in Hastings’s records.  Id.  
These circumstances, in the opinion of the dissent, warranted a finding that the policy, though 
facially neutral with regard to viewpoint, was enacted as a pretext for viewpoint discrimination and 
was thus unconstitutional.  Id. at 3018. 
 117.  Id. at 3020. 
 118.  See id. at 3019–20.  The dissent’s perception of the future consequences of the majority’s 
holding was shared by multiple amici: 
There are religious groups that cannot in good conscience agree in their bylaws that they 
will admit persons who do not share their faith, and for these groups, the consequence of 
an accept-all-comers policy is marginalization. See Brief for Evangelical Scholars 
(Officers and 24 Former Presidents of the Evangelical Theological Society) et al. as 
Amici Curiae 19 (affirmance in this case “will allow every public college and university 
in the United States to exclude all evangelical Christian organizations”); Brief for 
Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae 3, 8 (affirmance would “point a judicial 
dagger at the heart of the Orthodox Jewish community in the United States” and permit 
that community to be relegated to the status of “a second-class group”); Brief for Union 
of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America as Amicus Curiae 3 (affirmance “could 
significantly affect the ability of [affiliated] student clubs and youth movements . . . to 
prescribe requirements for their membership and leaders based on religious beliefs and 
commitments”).  This is where the Court’s decision leads. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
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 C.  Post-Martinez America and the Potential Influence of Hosanna-Tabor 
Justice Alito and his fellow dissenters in Martinez seem to have 
possessed a level of clarity usually relegated to hindsight.  More and more 
colleges, both public and private, have instituted and enforced various 
nondiscrimination policies that effectively force all religious student groups 
operating according to bylaws in opposition to such policies to disregard 
cherished aspects of their beliefs to remain recognized as a student group.119 
At San Diego State University, two religious student groups—the Alpha 
Delta Chi sorority and the Alpha Gamma Omega fraternity—were denied 
official recognition under the university’s nondiscrimination policy.120  
Vanderbilt University’s all-comers policy, which the school’s administration 
defended on the basis of Martinez, led to the dismissal of thirteen student 
groups whose bylaws included provisions determined to be discriminatory 
by Vanderbilt’s administration.121  At Yale University, the Christian 
fraternity Beta Upsilon Chi chose to de-register as a recognized student 
group—giving up the ability to receive grant money, participate in school 
events, and access school facilities—so as to maintain its policy of only 
allowing Christians to become members.122 
The widespread refusal to officially recognize groups whose religious 
beliefs compel them to act contrary to the antidiscrimination considerations 
embodied by all-comers policies could eventually result in the absence of 
religious viewpoints in the forums where diversity of viewpoints should be 
most highly regarded.123  The effects of Martinez on religious liberty are 
 
 119.  See infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
 120.  See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant university’s 
policy, finding the nondiscrimination policy constitutional with regard to the free-speech and 
expressive-association arguments brought by the student groups.  Id. at 805. 
 121.  Exiled from Vanderbilt: How Colleges Are Driving Religious Groups Off Campus, FOUND. 
FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://thefire.org/article/14778.html.  The video 
featured on this page narrates the process by which Vanderbilt came to its decision to implement an 
all-comers policy and the subsequent consequences that decision had on groups, both religious and 
secular, on campus.  Id. 
 122.  See Katherine Weber, Yale’s First Christian Fraternity Begins Spring Rush Without 
University Benefits, CHRISTIAN POST (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.christianpost.com/ 
news/yales-first-christian-fraternity-begins-spring-rush-without-university-benefits-88718/.  
 123.  See William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications 
of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 EDUC. L. REP. 473, 496 (2010).  The authors recognized 
the long-term implications that Martinez could have on the presence of religion on university 
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clear and severe: religious student groups seeking to exercise their 
expressive association rights within the walls of a public university are no 
longer free to do so unless such expression is strictly in accordance with the 
will of the school.124  
Despite Martinez’s effect, Hosanna-Tabor presents a glimmer of hope 
for religious liberty in America.125  The holding of Hosanna-Tabor—that a 
school teacher was a minister and was thus precluded from having her claim 
of illegal discrimination heard by the Court—helps ensure that all religious 
organizations maintain unadulterated control over who represents them as 
“ministers.”126  Though the public’s reaction to such unfettered religious 
 
campuses, noting that: 
Intellectual advancement has traditionally progressed through discord and dissent, as a 
diversity of views ensures that ideas survive because they are correct, not because they 
are popular.  Colleges and universities—sheltered from the currents of popular opinion 
by tradition, geography, tenure and monetary endowments—have historically fostered 
that exchange.  But that role in our society will not survive if certain points of view may 
be declared beyond the pale . . . . 
 The marketplace of ideas must remain free and all viewpoints must have space to 
flourish. 
 Unfortunately, in Christian Legal Society a bare majority of the Supreme Court 
ignored this principle. 
Id. 
 124.  See id. at 488–89 (“If an organization expresses a belief that is offensive to a segment of 
society, then the government may force the group to dilute its message or abandon use of 
government property and communication channels.”). 
 125.  John Inazu, an associate professor of law at Washington University in St. Louis, noted that 
“[i]n light of . . . Martinez, Hosanna-Tabor is a welcome reminder that the Court has not lost sight of 
the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”  Hosanna-Tabor an Important Victory for Religious Liberty, NEWSROOM, WASH. 
UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://news.wustl.edu/news/Pages/23215.aspx (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Matthew J. Franck, What Comes After Hosanna-Tabor, FIRST THINGS 
(Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2012/01/what-comes-after-hosanna-tabor 
(“Yesterday’s unanimous Supreme Court decision in Hosanna-Tabor . . . is very good news indeed 
for religious freedom.”). 
 126.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012).  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, clearly articulated the relationship between 
church and state with regard to employment practices: 
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for 
failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision.  Such action 
interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over 
the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.  By imposing an unwanted minister, 
the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to 
shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.  According the state the power 
to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the 
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freedom with regard to employment practices is split,127 those who agree 
with the Court’s decision do so fervently, heralding it as one of the most 
important religious liberty decisions in decades.128 
To those unfamiliar with the constitutional considerations that led to 
their respective holdings, Martinez and Hosanna-Tabor seem to send mixed 
messages with regard to the sanctity of religious liberty in this country.129  
On the one hand, those young men and women attending public universities 
who desire to run a student group in accordance with their faith are faced 
with substantial associational burdens due to the potential lack of access to 
university facilities.130  On the other, an employee of a religious organization 
may lose all protections of Title VII and other antidiscrimination legislation 
when the circumstances of her job persuade a court to deem her a minister.131  
Why would the Court unanimously condone a religiously affiliated school 
firing a teacher in violation of a federal statute but uphold a policy that 
penalizes a religious group for deciding who can join its ranks?  Both cases 
involve governmental interests concerning the prevention of discrimination 
 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical 
decisions. 
Id. 
 127.  Fairleigh Dickinson University’s poll of 855 registered voters nationwide revealed a clear 
split in American opinion on the issue: 46% of those polled said that “churches should have the right 
to hire and fire employees for religious reasons without having to follow government employment 
rules,” while 43% of those polled felt that “churches should follow the same rules as government 
and business when it comes to hiring and firing.”  In Contrast to High Court, US Voters Split on 
Freedom of Churches to Hire and Fire, PUB. MIND, FAIRLEIGH DICKENSON UNIV. (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/hosanna/.  
 128.  See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Discrimination Laws Do Not Protect Certain Employees 
of Religious Groups, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
supreme-court-discrimination-laws-do-not-protect-certain-employees-of-religious-groups/2012/01/1 
1/gIQAIbO4qP_story.html (quoting Richard W. Garnett, the director of Notre Dame Law School’s 
Program in Church, State, and Society, as saying that “the ruling is the court’s most important 
decision on religious freedom in decades”); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 837 (2012) (“It is not too much to say that the decision augurs a 
‘new birth of freedom’ for the religious communities of America.”). 
 129.  In a short essay written days after the Hosanna-Tabor decision, David French addressed the 
apparent inconsistencies as well as the key legal and factual distinctions between the two cases and 
correctly concluded that though Hosanna-Tabor does not overrule Martinez, it does potentially 
present a new view of religious liberty.  David French, Is the Court Changing Its Stand on Religious 
Freedom?, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.mindingthecampus.com/forum/2012/ 
01/is_the_court_changing_its_stan.html. 
 130.  See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part III.C.   
 131.  See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.  
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and the freedom of religious groups or organizations to choose who will 
represent them; how can the Constitution lead to such opposite conclusions? 
As previously explained, this Comment explores the potential influence 
that the ministerial exception, and the constitutional considerations behind it, 
could have on the relationship between religious student groups such as CLS 
and the public universities where such groups gather.  The purpose of this 
Comment is not to criticize the Court’s reasoning in Martinez, but simply to 
offer a different perspective on the situation, now quite common, dealt with 
in that case.  The issue of religious liberty is of the utmost importance to 
those whose lives are inextricably tied to the beliefs to which they adhere, 
and thus, it is necessary to look at the ways by which protection of such 
liberty can be ensured as broadly as the Constitution allows by creatively 
and thoughtfully asking questions, the answers to which may provide further 
clarity as to the appropriate relationship between church and state.   
IV.  UNIVERSITY NONDISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE 
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The circumstances surrounding the application of the ministerial 
exception and the interests involved in such application are closely mirrored 
in university student-group situations like the one in Martinez where a 
religious student group’s desire to remain true to its convictions clashes 
head-on with a university nondiscrimination policy.132  More often than not, 
the ministerial exception is asserted by religious organizations as a 
jurisdictional defense to suits brought against them that allege employment 
practices in violation of antidiscrimination legislation such as Title VII.133  
The rigorous application of the ministerial exception in such cases seems to 
imply that the reasons behind it could, theoretically, mandate a similar 
exception that would apply in scenarios where discrimination is alleged 
outside of the employment context—specifically, to situations where the 
alleged discrimination is conducted by a religious student group at a 
 
 132.  See infra notes 135–83 and accompanying text.   
 133.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  Because most cases in which the ministerial 
exception is applied revolve around claims of discriminatory employment practices, the remainder of 
this article will focus mainly on similarities between situations where employment discrimination in 
violation of Title VII is alleged and situations such as the one in Martinez where CLS’s practices 
were deemed discriminatory. 
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university.134  Though neither the Court’s opinion nor even CLS’s briefing 
made any mention of the ministerial exception, the circumstantial 
similarities between Martinez and case law interpreting and invoking the 
ministerial exception beg the question: should the ministerial exception be 
used as a basis for establishing an exception to nondiscrimination policies 
with regard to religious student groups and their ability to choose which 
students will serve as their leaders? 
A. Title VII and University Nondiscrimination Policies: A Common 
Purpose 
Title VII and other antidiscrimination legislation, the all-comers policy 
in Martinez, and various nondiscrimination policies in effect at universities 
across the country all serve the same end: combating discrimination.135  Title 
VII, applicable to all employers, prohibits any discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.136  While the all-comers policy 
analyzed by the majority in Martinez forbids discrimination on any basis,137 
more common nondiscrimination policies forbid discrimination on the basis 
of enumerated traits and statuses.138 
 
 134.  See infra notes 135–83 and accompanying text. 
 135.  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct.. 2971, 2994 (2010) (“The Law School’s policy aims at the act of rejecting 
would-be group members without reference to the reasons motivating that behavior: Hastings’ desire 
to redress the perceived harms of exclusionary membership policies provides an adequate 
explanation for its all-comers condition . . . .”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted); 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254 (1994) (noting that the statutory purpose of Title 
VII and the ADA are “eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons 
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination”) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 421 (1975)); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 n.5 (1988) 
(noting that federal and state governments have a “compelling interest in combating invidious 
discrimination” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 136.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 137.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See A.5 Equal Opportunity, UNIV. OF S. CAL. STUDENT GUIDEBOOK, 
http://scampus.usc.edu/a-5-equal-opportunity (last updated July 2013) [hereinafter USC Policy] 
(forbidding discrimination based on “sex, race, color, national origin, citizenship, ancestry, religion, 
gender, gender identify, gender expression, sexual orientation, age, physical disability, medical 
condition, mental disability, marital status, pregnancy, veteran status, genetic information, and any 
other characteristic that may be specified in applicable laws and governmental regulations”); 
Chapter 6: Nondiscrimination Statement, UNIV. OF IOWA OPERATIONS MANUAL, 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~our/opmanual/ii/06.htm (forbidding discrimination on the basis of “race, 
national origin, color, creed, religion, sex, age, disability, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender 
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Historically speaking, Title VII was the first congressionally 
implemented program that successfully changed the discriminatory practices 
that had become prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century.139  Since 
then, additional antidiscrimination laws have been passed at both the federal 
and state level in order to further protect employees from termination based 
on a trait over which they have no control.140  Fifty years ago, the idea of 
requiring employers to not discriminate based on race or gender was new 
and controversial.141  Now, any lesser standard seems odd and out of place.  
In light of this socially accepted and legally mandated norm of inclusion and 
acceptance in the workplace, it would indeed be odd for different standards 
to exist in our universities.  This country has witnessed in the last half-
century monumental strides toward equality, and universities are simply 
keeping pace.142  Indeed, Hastings, in its brief to the Supreme Court in 
Martinez, defended its all-comers policy on the fact that “California law 
declares that no person shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
various enumerated factors, including sexual orientation and religion, in ‘any 
program or activity conducted by any postsecondary educational institution’ 
that receives any financial assistance from the state.”143  The direct 
 
identity, or associational preference”); Duke University Non-Discrimination Policy, DUKE LAW, 
http://law.duke.edu/admis/nondiscrimination/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, disability, veteran status, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, sex, genetic information, or age”). 
 139.  Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (1966) (“[T]he 
history of [Fair Employment Practices] legislation prior to 1964 was characterized by repeated 
failures for civil rights advocates.”).  The incredible change induced by Title VII was not lost on 
Vaas as he noted that the Act “brought to fruition the labors and aspirations of civil rights 
proponents everywhere, made possible that which has never before been possible in America and 
will leave a lasting mark on the structure of American society.”  Id. at 457. 
 140.  One such piece of legislation is the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits an 
employer from discriminating against someone on the basis of disability.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(2012).  Another is the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which prohibits an 
employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of age.  29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012). 
 141.  See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of 
the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 432 (2005) 
(noting the “pervasiveness of racial discrimination” in the United States prior to the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 142.  See, e.g., USC Policy, supra note 138 (“The university is committed to complying with all 
applicable laws and governmental regulations at every level of government which prohibit 
discrimination . . . .  This commitment applies to all of the university’s educational programs and 
activities . . . .”). 
 143.  Brief of Hastings Coll. of the Law Respondents at 33–34, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of 
the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), 2010 WL 1513023, 
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relationship between Hastings’s all-comers policy and the antidiscrimination 
legislation used to defend it further justifies applying to the all-comers 
policy the same judicial exceptions that apply to, and limit, such 
antidiscrimination legislation. 
Admittedly, the goal of ending discrimination is one worth working 
towards, and every policy—whether applicable nationally, statewide, or 
simply within the walls of a university—that is implemented in good 
conscience as a means to attain that goal is one worthy of enforcement.  
However, exceptions must exist.  After four decades of the ministerial 
exception’s recognition within the circuit courts, the Supreme Court in 
Hosanna-Tabor unanimously concluded that a religious organization, be it a 
church or otherwise, must be free from such policies in order to maintain 
control of its faith and mission.144  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
unanimous court, illustrated this truth quite clearly: 
The interest of society in the enforcement of employment 
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important.  But so too is the 
interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their 
beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.  When a 
minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her 
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the 
balance for us.  The church must be free to choose those who will 
guide it on its way.145 
This understanding—that the mandates of Title VII, despite their 
legitimacy and value, must, in certain situations, yield to the right of a 
religious organization to choose who will “guide it on its way”146—supports 
the applicability of a similar exception in the context of a religious student 
group that seeks to control who will guide it on its own way as a campus 
organization.147  To provide a religious organization with an exception under 
 
at *33–34 (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66270 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)). 
 144.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 145.  Id. at 710. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  To be clear, this Comment purports to provide reasons for the creation of an exception to 
university nondiscrimination policies based on the existing ministerial exception that would give 
religious student groups the right to choose its leaders even if the bases for such a decision is in 
violation of those nondiscrimination policies.  It is not this Comment’s position that the ministerial 
exception provides grounds for a religious student group to discriminate with regard to its members, 
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which it can choose, on its own terms, who will represent it as employee-
ministers, while at the same time withholding the right from religious 
student groups to at least choose their representative leaders is inconsistent.  
Such inconsistency begs for reconciliation. 
B.  The Individual Interests Protected 
While both legislative- and university-enacted antidiscrimination 
policies work towards the same goal, the interests of the individuals 
protected by those respective policies are distinct in a way that lends further 
support for the creation of an exception to university nondiscrimination 
policies148 that would allow a religious student group to choose, even in 
violation of such policies, its leadership.149  Title VII, in its nearly fifty-year 
existence, has served to vigorously protect employees from any unlawful 
discrimination initiated by their employers at any stage of the employment 
process.150  In the years between 1997 and 2012, the EEOC—the agency 
 
but rather only its leaders.  Though a religious student group has a large interest in ensuring that its 
membership profess and adhere to the same beliefs and moral code as the collective, the ministerial 
exception’s rationale is likely not applicable to mere members of a religious student group. 
  Furthermore, CLS “has always welcomed all students to attend its events and activities” and 
only takes issue with all-comers policies or other nondiscrimination policies when they are applied 
in a way that precludes them from choosing their leaders.  Relations with the University, CHRISTIAN 
LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/pages/law-students/chapter-manual-relations-with-the-universi 
ty (last visited Oct. 22, 2013); id. (“An all-comers policy is only a problem if it is applied to a 
group’s leaders.”). 
 148.  The term “university nondiscrimination policy” is henceforth used to refer to both all-
comers policies like that analyzed in Martinez as well as other university policies that forbid 
discrimination on specifically enumerated grounds.  See supra Part III.B; see also note 138 and 
accompanying text. 
 149.  See infra notes 155–68 and accompanying text. 
 150.  See, e.g., EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013).  Title VII not only protects against discriminatory hiring or firing, but protects 
an individual through his term of employment by establishing that it is illegal for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
[Vol. 41: 157, 2013] All for One, and One for All-Comers! 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
190 
charged with the enforcement of Title VII and other antidiscrimination 
legislation151—filed 3,854 cases in which a Title VII claim was alleged.152  
As a result, roughly $1,012,900,000 was awarded in monetary benefits to 
those individuals who, during that time, suffered employment 
discrimination.153  For those individuals whose livelihoods are inextricably 
tied to an employer’s willingness to employ them, Title VII serves as the key 
means of ensuring that such livelihood remains unthreatened.154   
Ultimately, by establishing clear law that gives notice to employers of 
the severe penalties for discriminatory employment practices, Title VII 
ensures that an individual’s livelihood will not be compromised due to 
another’s views regarding race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.155  
Thus, the practical effect of Title VII is the preemptory protection of an 
individual’s interest in earning a living, coupled with a mechanism by which 
an individual can sue for the deprivation of that interest in any case where 
his or her employer violates Title VII.156   
Few would argue that the protections afforded by Title VII to an 
individual whose inherent traits subject them to potential discrimination are 
insignificant.  In fact, it seems quite reasonable to assert that a person’s 
interest in maintaining an avenue through which one can earn a living is, 
indeed, one of the most important interests any individual possesses.  The 
controversy surrounding the ministerial exception for the past forty years, in 
light of the interests involved, is understandable; the exception, at least from 
the viewpoint of the individuals who have been discriminated against in 
violation of Title VII, strips them of the protections they assumed were 
theirs under Title VII and similar legislation.157  Even from the perspective 
of one who fully supports and agrees with the ministerial exception, it is 
hard not to pity someone whose position within a religious institution, 
unbeknownst to her, resembled that of a “minister,” depriving her of any 
 
 151.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -5 (2012). 
 152.  See EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 150. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See Belton, supra note 141, at 432–33. 
 155.  See Bob Rosner, ‘Working Wounded’: What Is Title VII?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/WorkingWounded/story?id=86334&page=1 (“For an employee, 
Title VII is there to ensure they have the fairest opportunity for employment.  For an employer, 
ignoring or skirting the title can be costly.”).  
 156.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 157.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
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redress with regard to an allegedly discriminatory termination.158 
In comparison to the employment interest protected by Title VII, the 
practical interest protected by the all-comers policy and other 
nondiscrimination policies—essentially, the opportunity to associate with 
people who, for one reason or another, do not want such association to 
occur—seems rather trivial.  Admittedly, regardless of such triviality, the 
reasonableness and constitutionality of such policies have been approved by 
the Supreme Court and thus, that precedent is the law.159  However, just 
because a policy is constitutionally permissible does not negate the fact that 
the interests protected by such policy are arguably paradoxical.  In reality, an 
all-comers policy protects an atheist’s interest in becoming the president of a 
Christian group.  It protects a Jewish student’s interest in leading an anti-
Semitic rally on behalf of a neo-Nazi student group.  It protects a black 
student’s interest in becoming a card-carrying member of a White 
Supremacy group.  It protects a Republican student’s interest in serving as 
co-chair of a University Democrats group.160  The hyperbolic nature of these 
examples is not without purpose; rather, it illustrates a very real truth—the 
situations where a group would likely preclude an individual from joining as 
a member or serving as a leader are probably the same situations where the 
individual would have little desire to join or lead in the first place.161 
 
 158.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 694 
(2012) (elementary school teacher was a minister); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 
1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006) (music director and organist was a minister); Alicea-Hernandez v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (Hispanic communications manager was 
a minister); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(music director and part-time elementary school music teacher was a minister); Starkman v. Evans, 
198 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1999) (choir director was a minister). 
  While it is generally impossible to know whether each of the plaintiffs represented in these 
cases were aware of the ministerial exception, it seems likely that very few of them did.  
Furthermore, it seems even more likely that their positions in their respective religious organizations, 
in their minds, made it quite clear that they were not actually ministers, even if they were a part of 
the “ministry” of their employers.  This understanding seems to support the conclusion that each of 
these plaintiffs expected to be granted recourse through Title VII (or the ADA) and were likely very 
surprised to discover that their position in the religious organization precluded them from doing so. 
 159.  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988–92 (2010) (holding that the all-comers policy was indeed both 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral and thus, constitutional).  
 160.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 161.  See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2992 (“Students tend to self-sort and presumably will not 
endeavor en masse to join—let alone seek leadership positions in—groups pursuing missions wholly 
at odds with their personal beliefs.”).  
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The point of this illustration is not to cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
one’s right to access a group, but rather to point out the practical lack of 
interest one has in acting upon that right.  Clearly, the Court in Martinez felt 
that an individual’s right—created by an all-comers policy—to serve as a 
leader within a group where both the individual and the collective would 
likely be entirely uninterested in entertaining that idea, is worth 
preserving.162  Similarly, there is little doubt that a person’s right to secure 
and maintain employment solely on the basis of one’s abilities is a right 
worth protecting.163  The fact of the matter remains, though, that the disparity 
in interest between the protection of one’s source of income and one’s 
theoretical membership or leadership role in a club is great.164  Yet, one’s 
employment interest has been deemed subservient to the right of religious 
institutions to choose their ministers165—even when such ministers look a lot 
like schoolteachers166—while one’s interest in preserving the option of 
joining and leading a club whose announced purpose is exactly opposite to 
one’s belief reigns supreme over a religious student group’s ability to choose 
who will lead it.167  If the Supreme Court is unanimously willing to apply the 
ministerial exception in a way that deprives a schoolteacher of the statutorily 
established means by which she could repair her employment interest,168 
then surely a similar exception could be extended to dilute a college 
student’s interest in leading a club that he likely has no desire to join. 
C.  A Religious Student Group’s Interest in Choosing its Leaders 
Unlike the individual interests protected by Title VII enforcement and 
an all-comers or nondiscrimination policy, the interests of those employers 
seeking exemption from the mandates of Title VII through the application of 
the ministerial exception are parallel to the interests of those religious 
student groups, like CLS, seeking exemption from the nondiscrimination 
policies of their respective universities with regard to the selection of their 
 
 162.  See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 164.  Compare supra note 150 (discussing the interests protected by Title VII), with supra note 96 
(discussing the interests protected by an all-comers policy).  
 165.  See discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
 166.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 167.  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 168.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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student leadership.169  For over four decades, federal appellate courts across 
the country—including, as of recently, the Supreme Court—have repeatedly 
protected the rights and interests of religious organizations by allowing such 
organizations the freedom to choose who will represent them as ministers.170  
This interest does not simply involve the freedom to choose who will guide 
the faithful in the tenets and moral code of the religious organization, but it 
also includes the interest in choosing which persons qualify to serve as 
representative ambassadors to the public at large, exemplifying the lifestyle 
and beliefs of the organization on the whole.171  Though an organization’s 
interest in choosing its members is generally protected solely by the First 
Amendment right to freedom of association,172 courts have repeatedly 
recognized that the decision of who will serve in the position of minister 
within a religious organization, due to the important function such a role 
plays within a religious organization and in the public eye, is further 
protected by the Free Exercise clause.173  This is the essence of the 
ministerial exception. 
It is prudent to address some glaring differences between the ministerial 
exception as historically applied and the theoretical extension of such 
 
 169.  See infra notes 170–96 and accompanying text. 
 170.  See discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
 171.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 713 
(2012) (Alito, J, concurring).  Justice Alito, writing a separate concurrence, recognized the dual 
nature of a minister’s role, stating that: 
When it comes to the expression and inculcation of religious doctrine, there can be no 
doubt that the messenger matters.  Religious teachings cover the gamut from moral 
conduct to metaphysical truth, and both the content and credibility of a religion’s 
message depend vitally on the character and conduct of its teachers.  A religion cannot 
depend on someone to be an effective advocate for its religious vision if that person’s 
conduct fails to live up to the religious precepts that he or she espouses.  For this reason, 
a religious body’s right to self-governance must include the ability to select, and to be 
selective about, those who will serve as the very “embodiment of its message” and “its 
voice to the faithful.”  A religious body’s control over such “employees” is an essential 
component of its freedom to speak in its own voice, both to its own members and to the 
outside world. 
Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 172.  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010).  The Martinez Court, before determining that a limited-
public-forum analysis was proper, recognized that “[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presupposes 
a freedom not to associate” and that “[i]nsisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members . 
. . directly and immediately affects associational rights.”  Id. (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 173.  See discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
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doctrine to exempt, in part, a religious student group from various 
antidiscrimination policies that have been deemed both reasonable and 
constitutional by the Supreme Court.174  First, religious student groups like 
CLS are generally not employers as defined by Title VII, and they generally 
do not sell products, provide services for purchase, or pay wages to those 
associated with them.175  Neither members nor leaders of such student groups 
receive any monetary benefit for their participation in the group, but rather 
choose to volunteer their time to help further the goals of the organization 
itself.176  Secondly, members are only associated with the group for the time 
during which they attend the university where the group meets; leaders, on 
the other hand, generally serve in such capacity for only a one-year term, to 
be replaced by those members voted into the leadership position for the 
following year.177  Some may argue that these distinctions, in and of 
themselves, should preclude religious student groups from enjoying the 
freedoms created in the employment context by the ministerial exception.  
However, the factual distinctions between a religious employer and a 
religious student group do not lessen the similar interests such organizations 
have with regard to choosing their leadership.  It is this similarity in interest 
 
 174.  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 175.  According to Title VII, the following delineates which organizations are classified as 
employers: 
The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who 
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such 
term does not include . . . (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor 
organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26 . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (2012).  
  According to its Articles of Incorporation and their subsequent amendments, CLS is exempt 
from taxation under section 501(c)(3) as a corporation organized exclusively for religious purposes 
and is thus not an employer for purposes of Title VII.  Articles of Incorporation, CHRISTIAN LEGAL 
SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/document.doc?id=1 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
 176.  This is true of most student organizations, regardless of whether they self-identify as 
religious.  CLS, in its “Running a Student Chapter” manual, recognizes the lack of payment to 
leaders in its statement that “students who volunteer should occupy the offices most suited to their 
strengths and talents.”  Running a Student Chapter, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.clsnet.org/pages/law-students/chapter-manual-running-a-chapter [hereinafter CLS 
Chapter Manual] (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 177.  Though the CLS Chapter Manual does not explicitly point out this fact, it is clearly inferred 
that leadership positions are limited in time, as officers and other leaders are encouraged to “‘work 
themselves out of a job’ by training and delegating tasks to the new leadership well before 
graduation . . . so that one of them can quickly assume [the] position the next year.”  Id. 
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that provides further justification for the creation of an exception from the 
mandates of a university nondiscrimination policy, at least with regard to a 
religious student group’s ability to ensure that its leaders share the same 
beliefs as the collective. 
For devoted religious students interested in building their faiths during 
their time at a university or a post-graduate institution, a religious student 
group presents the invaluable opportunity to engage in fellowship with like-
minded peers, serves as a forum to collectively study the scripture in which 
their faith is grounded, provides an opportunity to worship, and, in many 
cases, offers the privilege to hear from various speakers on topics related to 
the faith, including how the faith has impacted their own lives.178  Depending 
on the university, a student’s participation in a group that shares his or her 
own beliefs may be the only way to experience relationships with others 
who are religiously like-minded.  Thus, though a religious student group is 
not the equivalent of a church or a religious employer, it serves a vital 
function on a university campus for those seeking to build and express their 
own faith.179  It is the importance of a religious student group from the 
perspective of a religious student that creates the interest in the group’s 
ability to choose a leader whose beliefs coincide with that of the group so as 
to ensure that the operation of the group continues to provide the invaluable 
spiritual and relational support that a religious student on a secular campus 
so desperately needs.180   
A second parallel between a church’s interest in choosing its ministers 
and a religious student group’s interest in choosing its leadership exists in 
the representational role that an individual appointed to the position of 
 
 178.  See Campus Fellowships, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx? 
pid=411 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).  In an introduction to its student affiliates’ role on their 
respective campuses, CLS acknowledges that: 
Law school is the formative period in every attorney’s life—setting patterns and habits 
that will long endure and, in the case of bad tendencies, will only be broken with anguish.  
It is imperative that Christian law students seek out one another for fellowship, 
encouragement, and accountability.  As a supplement to involvement in the local church, 
a Christian law fellowship should facilitate a closer relationship with Christ, so that in the 
words of the 10th century prayer, He may defend, refresh, preserve, guide, justify, and 
bless us. 
Id. 
 179.  See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 180.  See, e.g., CLS Chapter Manual, supra note 176 (“The maintenance of a vibrant chapter rests 
in large part on the ability of its leadership to motivate the general membership to undertake the 
group’s activities and responsibilities.”).  
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minister or leader has in relation to the public perception of the church or 
group, respectively.  The effect of church scandals in the past decade 
illustrates this truth.181  The child-abuse scandal that has continued to plague 
the Catholic Church has resulted in the majority of Americans expressing an 
unfavorable opinion of the institution on the whole, leading the Church to 
“devote every available resource to restoring the public image of the 
Catholic priesthood.”182  Similar reputational devastation befell the National 
Association of Evangelicals in 2006 when Ted Haggard—the pastor of the 
New Life mega-church in Denver, president of the National Association of 
Evangelicals, and “poster child for the evangelical movement in the United 
States”—“admitted that he had been involved with a male prostitute,” which 
resulted in gay activists who opposed the evangelical movement “gloating 
over the apparent hypocrisy of Christians who oppose homosexuality on one 
hand while they participate in it secretly.”183  As Justice Alito noted in 
Hosanna-Tabor, when it comes to religion, “the messenger matters.”184 
While those who subscribe to a set of beliefs on their own merits rather 
than on the merits of the person preaching them may not impute the 
shortcomings of the messenger onto the message, people unfamiliar with or 
in opposition to the beliefs espoused by church leaders whose hypocritical 
actions expose them to public scorn will likely, either consciously or 
subconsciously, view the merits of such beliefs in a light less favorable than 
before.  Religious student groups face this same reality.185  While the 
 
 181.  See infra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.  
 182.  See, e.g., Dalia Sussman, Poll: Catholic Church’s Image at New Low, ABC NEWS, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90409&page=1 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The report showed that 52% of Americans expressed an unfavorable opinion of the 
Church following the child-abuse scandal, a figure up 25 percentage points over a ten-month period.  
Id.   
 183. See J. Lee Grady, Making (Some) Sense of the Ted Haggard Scandal, CHRISTIAN 
BROADCASTING NETWORK, http://www.cbn.com/spirituallife/churchandministry/charisma_grady_ 
haggard_scandal.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2013); Jesse Carey, Michael Phelps and Ted Haggard: 
The Connection, CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK, http://www.cbn.com/spirituallife/ 
BibleStudyAndTheology/perspectives/Carey_haggard_phelps.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (“In 
2006, allegations were made that Ted Haggard maintained an inappropriate relationship with a male 
prostitute and used drugs during their meetings.”).  
 184.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 713 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 185.  This understanding is not lost on religious groups like CLS, which, in its manual for running 
a student chapter, outlined the requirements that its leaders “should be committed Christians” and 
that “[t]hey ought to so manifest ‘the fruit of the Spirit, which is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, 
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control’ (Galatians 5:22–23) that their profession of 
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president of a religious student organization is likely faced with a lesser 
degree of scrutiny in the public eye, the fact remains that the relationship 
between a student group and the university’s administration, student body, 
and faculty hinges on the ability of the group’s leadership to act in a way 
that positively portrays the goals and beliefs of the group.186   
It is, admittedly, difficult to say that the gravity of a student group’s 
interest in choosing its leaders is equal to a church’s monumental interest in 
choosing its ministers.  However, the dual-nature of the interest is the 
same.187  And in light of the disparity between the individual interests 
protected by Title VII and an all-comers policy,188 the interest of a religious 
student group in choosing who will lead it seems more than sufficient to 
warrant an exception to the mandates of any university antidiscrimination 
policy, thus allowing such choice to be available. 
D.  Imposing Penalties and Withholding Benefits: An Unwarranted 
Distinction 
Beyond the similarities between Title VII and a university 
nondiscrimination policy and the effects each program has on the individuals 
and groups that fall under their mandates,189 the recent application of the 
ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor addresses some of the exact issues 
that the Martinez Court analyzed with regard to their effect on CLS’s 
expressive-association rights.190  In Martinez, the Court relied heavily on the 
distinction between compelling action and withholding benefits in coming to 
its conclusion that the RSO program’s constitutionality was to be analyzed 
 
Christian faith is credible.”  CLS Chapter Manual, supra note 177.  This requirement of not only 
personal belief in the tenets of Christianity but also the manifestation of such beliefs in the actions of 
the leader is indicative of the fact that those in leadership positions serve as messengers and 
representatives of CLS’s beliefs.  See id.   
 186.  See id. (“You and your leadership team will need to work intentionally in order to maintain a 
vibrant group . . . and cultivate good relationships on campus and with university authorities.”). 
 187.  The “dual-nature” of this interest refers to an officer’s role in leading those within the 
student group in accordance with the purpose and beliefs of the group and the officer’s role as 
liaison between the religious student group and the university on the whole—including the 
administration, the faculty, and the student body.  See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text.  
 188.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 189.  See discussion supra Part IV.B–C.  
 190.  See infra notes 191–202 and accompanying text. 
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under the limited-public-forum framework.191  This distinction served as the 
foundation on which the constitutionality of the all-comers policy and the 
subsequent burdens it placed on religious student groups like CLS were 
built.192 
The distinction between compelling action and imposing monetary 
sanctions is less outcome-determinative in the ministerial exception 
context.193  In Hosanna-Tabor, the unanimous Court decided that enforcing 
monetary penalties against a religious organization for firing a minister in 
violation of the ADA is just as constitutionally impermissible as forcing the 
organization to retain that minister against its will.194   
Some likely would argue that the inconsistent conclusions in Martinez 
and Hosanna-Tabor regarding the difference between compelling action and 
penalizing inaction are defensible due to the distinction between withholding 
a monetary benefit and enforcing a monetary penalty.  In essence, however, 
the distinction lies only in the observable effect on the bank account of the 
religious student group or religious organization in question.195  The action 
prohibited by Hosanna-Tabor—enforcing a monetary penalty in the form of 
damages against a religious organization because of its decision to fire its 
minister196—would essentially result in that religious organization having 
less in its bank account than it should have had.  In Martinez, part of the 
punishment for CLS’s refusal to forego its right to choose its leaders on its 
own terms was the withholding of funds available to all RSOs—essentially 
resulting in CLS’s bank account staying the same when, but for the 
enforcement of the all-comers policy, it should have increased in size.197  
This simple truth was recognized in Sherbert v. Verner when the Court 
 
 191.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  To the Court, the fact that “Hastings, through its 
RSO program, [was] dangling the carrot of subsidy, [and] not wielding the stick of prohibition[,]” 
compelled the use of the less-restrictive limited-public-forum analysis.  Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2975 (2010).   
 192.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986, 2975; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
 193.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also infra note 194 and accompanying text.  
 194.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 
(2012) (“Perich continues to seek frontpay . . . backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and 
attorney’s fees.  An award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an 
unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order 
overturning the termination.”). 
 195.  See infra notes 196–200 and accompanying text. 
 196.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709. 
 197.  See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2974. 
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stated, “[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon [one’s] willingness 
to violate a cardinal principle of [one’s] religious faith effectively penalizes 
the free exercise of [one’s] constitutional liberties.”198  This precedent, 
however, seems to have gone unnoticed by the Court in Martinez when it 
found that depriving CLS of funds it should have had through the 
implementation of an all-comers policy was constitutional;199 yet, the Court 
in Hosanna-Tabor found that even hearing a case that could result in 
depriving the Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran School of funds it should have had 
was unconstitutional.200 
While the limited-public-forum analysis employed in Martinez relies 
heavily on a distinction between compelling action and withholding benefits 
with regard to a group’s First Amendment right of expressive association,201 
such distinction is much less consequential with regard to the application of 
the ministerial exception.202  This difference in analysis, coupled with the 
circumstantial similarities between Title VII and a university 
nondiscrimination policy,203 provides further reason to implement an 
exception to a university nondiscrimination policy that would allow for a 
religious student group to choose who will serve as its leaders. 
 
 198.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).  But cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of 
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990) (“Although, as noted earlier, we have sometimes used the 
Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges to such laws, we have never applied the test to 
invalidate one.  We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the 
vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Stroman v. Lower Merion Twp., No. 06–3858, 2007 WL 475817, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 
2007) (“In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith . . . the Supreme Court held 
that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general 
application that incidentally burden religious conduct.  This case, in effect, overruled Sherbert v. 
Verner . . . .”).  But see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (reaffirming that lower courts 
cannot maintain that the Supreme Court overruled a case unless the court explicitly states as much). 
 199.  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 (2010). 
 200.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning 
of the exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit 
against her religious employer.”). 
 201.  See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986. 
 202.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 203.  See discussion supra Part IV.A.  
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 V.  MINISTERS ON CAMPUS: APPLICATION OF THE CURRENT MINISTERIAL 
EXCEPTION 
While the preceding sections dealt specifically with the creation of an 
exception to university nondiscrimination policies that would give religious 
student groups the freedom to choose their leadership, this section looks 
instead to the current state of the law surrounding the ministerial exception 
and the extent to which CLS and its student leadership could satisfy the 
various standards used in applying the ministerial exception.  In reality, the 
ministerial exception as it currently exists—as a jurisdictional bar precluding 
a court from hearing an employment discrimination claim brought against a 
religious organization by one of its ministers204—gives little direct relief to 
religious student groups, as their predicament is not being brought to court, 
but rather being kept from operating as recognized student groups at various 
universities across the country.205   
Though the historical application of the ministerial exception can 
provide little direct relief to religious student groups, the analysis used by 
courts over the last forty years to determine whether the ministerial 
exception is applicable to a case is helpful to show how religious student 
groups and their leaders are not so different from religious organizations and 
their ministers as defined by various courts.206  Upon such analysis, a 
hypothetical inquiry into whether CLS—the religious student group bringing 
suit in Martinez—would be protected from an employment discrimination 
suit brought by one of its leaders is helpful in further establishing the need 
for an exception to university nondiscrimination policies. 
Let us assume, then, that a fired president of a student chapter of CLS 
brought suit against the organization on the grounds that he was terminated 
in violation of Title VII.  In determining the applicability of the ministerial 
exception to the case, the court would have to answer two questions in the 
affirmative: First, is CLS a religious organization for purposes of the 
exception?  Second, if so, is the president of a student chapter a minister of 
CLS?207 
 
 204.  See discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
 205.  See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 206.  See discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
 207.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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 A.  CLS as a Religious Organization for Purposes of the Ministerial 
Exception 
The analysis used to determine whether an entity is a religious 
organization varies from circuit to circuit.208  However, the analytical 
distinctions between circuits have little practical effect, as CLS is quite 
clearly a religious organization under any test.209  Under the Leboon 
factors210 or the Spencer test,211 CLS—as a national organization comprised 
of both student and non-student chapters—is a “primarily religious”212 
organization because: it is a non-profit corporation;213 the products CLS sells 
in its online store are embroidered with its logo and are sold to allow people 
to “proudly display [their] support of CLS;”214 CLS’s articles of 
incorporation explicitly set forth a religious purpose;215 CLS, through its 
name and actions, holds itself out to the public as a religious organization 
primarily concerned with carrying out its religious purpose;216 and CLS’s 
 
 208.  See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See infra notes 210–17 and accompanying text. 
 210.  See Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007); see 
also supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 211.  See Spencer v. Word Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 734 (9th Cir. 2010); see also supra note 48 
and accompanying text. 
 212.  See Leboon, 503 F.3d at 226. 
 213.  See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 214.  CLS Store, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=472 (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2013).  
 215.  See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 175. 
 216.  See About Us, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid=327 (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013).  CLS is made up of the following four ministries: 
Attorney Ministries[:] CLS Local Chapters throughout the country provide opportunities 
for Christian witnessing, law-focused discipleship, law student mentoring, contributions 
to our magazine The Christian Lawyer, legal referrals, and volunteer legal service on 
behalf of the disadvantaged. 
Law Student Ministries[:] CLS helps students in law schools across the country 
integrate their Christian faith with the study and eventual practice of law.  The ministry 
includes Bible studies for students, one-on-one mentoring by CLS members, student-
focused conferences, and faith-based curriculum services to law schools. 
Legal Aid Ministries[:] Since 2000, thousands of CLS members have donated 
hundreds of thousands of legal service hours helping the disadvantaged untangle 
debilitating legal issues, seek Christian guidance for personal problems, and understand 
their rights under the law. 
Center for Law and Religious Freedom (CLRF)[:] As the country’s oldest Christian 
advocacy ministry for religious liberty, CLRF has initiated law suits, filed amicus briefs, 
argued cases, and worked with Congress to defend our Constitution’s First Amendment 
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membership is made up entirely of Christian lawyers and law students 
partnering together to further that purpose.217  It would be hard to imagine a 
more “religious” organization. 
B.  A Student President’s Role as a Minister of CLS 
Whether a student-chapter president could be a minister under current 
precedent is a different story.  The analyses used by circuit courts are varied, 
and the Court in Hosanna-Tabor provided very little clarity with regard to 
the proper way to determine ministerial status.218  Thus, the ministerial 
exception will continue to be applied via a malleable standard and not a 
“rigid formula” until the Supreme Court has the opportunity to once again 
revisit the doctrine.219 
Presently, the majority’s fact-specific analysis in Hosanna-Tabor 
indicates at least a partial reliance on role-based considerations.220  The 
majority’s consideration of the “important religious functions” that Perich 
performed as a teacher at Hosanna-Tabor recognizes that titles alone are not 
indicative of one’s legal status of “minister;” still, the majority did factor 
into its analysis the fact that Perich possessed the title of minister and held 
herself out as such.221  While the majority clearly considered the importance 
of a person’s function within a religious organization, its refusal to consider 
the legal significance of this function independent from the title Perich 
possessed makes application of the Court’s analysis extremely difficult with 
regard to a hypothetical case between a president of a CLS student chapter 
and CLS itself.222  However, the majority’s insistence that the issue of 
 
protection of religious freedom. 
Id.  The work done by CLS through these four ministries—the publication of The Christian Lawyer 
magazine, the facilitation of Bible studies for law students and practitioners, the pro bono legal work 
for the disadvantaged through the Legal Aid Ministries, and the advocacy done by CLRF—clearly 
indicates that CLS holds itself out to the public as a religious organization furthering a clearly 
religious purpose.  See id.  
 217.  See Vision & Mission Statement, CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC’Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx 
?pid=820 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (CLS’s vision is of “[a] growing nationwide fellowship of 
Christian lawyers and law students who act justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with their God.”).   
 218.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705–10 
(2012); see also discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
 219.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see also discussion supra Parts II–III.A. 
 220.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707–09; see also supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.  
 221.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09; see also supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.   
 222.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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whether someone is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception “is 
not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch” does strongly suggest that a 
person’s religious functions are not to be weighed against the amount of 
time spent on purely secular functions.223   
Under the fact-specific majority approach, it is very difficult to 
determine whether a president of a CLS student chapter would be a minister.  
Unlike Perich, whose position as a “called” teacher bestowed upon her the 
title of minister,224 a student’s role as president does not do the same.  And, 
without such a title, that president could not hold himself out as a minister 
by claiming a tax-exemption based on his position, as Perich did.225  
However, it seems that the religious functions performed by a CLS 
president—praying for the student chapter and facilitating bible studies, 
worship nights, and other member meetings—would act as a counterbalance 
to the lack of any technical title indicative of a ministerial position.226  
Whether such functions would outweigh the absence of any formal title is 
difficult to determine under the majority approach.  
Justice Thomas’s approach and the high level of deference it gives “to a 
religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its 
minister” would, arguably, bar a suit between a president of a CLS student 
chapter and the organization itself.227  This bar, however, would entirely 
depend on CLS’s good-faith views with regard to the importance of a 
student leader within the organization on the whole.228  Under such an 
approach, if CLS could honestly say that the presidents of its student 
chapters all serve as ministers of the organization, then suits by any of those 
student presidents would be barred. 
The approach delineated in Justice Alito’s concurrence, seemingly based 
on the analysis used by circuit courts employing a “role-based” test,229 
 
 223.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 224.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 225.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 226.  See CLS Chapter Manual, supra note 176.  The “Running a Student Chapter” section of the 
Chapter Manual sets forth the obligations for leaders to “meet at least twice a month as a team to 
pray for one another and for other members, to cultivate a spirit of unity and friendship, and to plan 
the group’s meetings and events.”  Id.  
 227.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra note 81 and 
accompanying text. 
 228.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 229.  In his concurrence, Justice Alito relied on the widespread application of the functional 
approach among the circuit courts in coming to his determination regarding the correct test for 
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provides the most room for argument with regard to whether the president of 
a CLS student chapter is a minister under the ministerial exception.  Justice 
Alito’s understanding that the ministerial exception should bar any claim 
made by someone “who leads a religious organization, conducts worship 
services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a 
messenger or teacher of its faith” reflects the fact that religious organizations 
vary in the terminology used to identify who their religious leaders are.230  
Under this approach, it would be immaterial that the highest officer of a CLS 
student-group is called the “president” rather than the “minister.”231  Alicea-
Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a 2003 case from the Seventh 
Circuit, illustrates the breadth of the functional approach adhered to by 
Justice Alito.232  There, an employment discrimination claim was brought 
against a religious organization by a woman whose duties as a Hispanic 
Communications Manager “included composing media releases and 
correspondence as well as developing a working relationship with various 
constituencies of the Hispanic community and composing articles to be 
published in the Church media.”233  Relying on the understanding that the 
plaintiff served as “a liaison between the church as an institution and those 
whom it would touch with its message,” the court determined that her suit 
was barred by the ministerial exception.234 
The title of Hispanic Communications Manager, a position essentially 
equivalent to that of a press secretary, is not one that connotes a ministerial 
role.235  However, the practical importance of such a role in disseminating 
the message of the religious organization, in the opinion of the Seventh 
Circuit, mandated dismissal of the case on account of the ministerial 
exception.236  In light of cases like Alicea-Hernandez and the understanding 
that “the messenger matters,”237 a strong argument could be made for 
 
whether one is a minister.  See Hosana-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713–14 (Alito, J., concurring).  This 
functional approach is encompassed, for purposes of this Comment, under the term “role-based 
approach.” 
 230.  Id. at 712; supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 231.  See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 232.  320 F.3d 698, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 233.  Id. at 703–04. 
 234.  Id. at 704 (internal quotations omitted). 
 235.  See id.  
 236.  Id. at 703–04. 
 237.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 713 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring).  
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applying the ministerial exception in a case between a CLS student president 
and the organization on the whole.  A president of a CLS student chapter is 
charged with joining with other officers in prayer, is often responsible for 
organizing bible studies and other gatherings designed to strengthen the faith 
of those members in attendance, and is indeed the liaison between CLS and 
the university where the student group meets.238  Such functions are vital to 
the success of a CLS student-chapter—both in terms of internal growth and 
external influence on the rest of the student population—and therefore there 
is a compelling case, under a functional approach, for a CLS student-chapter 
president qualifying as a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception. 
That a reasonable argument can even be made to qualify a religious 
student group’s president as a minister under current case law lends further 
credence to the contention that an exception to university nondiscrimination 
policies should be instituted that would allow such groups the unadulterated 
right to choose those who will serve as their leaders.  It is well understood 
that a person’s status as “minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception 
does not hinge solely on the individual’s title; rather, the role that person 
plays within the religious organization in question is of the utmost 
importance.239  For religious student groups, the role that the group’s officers 
play is vital to the spiritual growth of its membership as well as the 
relationship created between the group and the university where it is 
based.240   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Conflicts in which competing interests are represented pose difficult and 
consequential questions for those in charge of diffusing them.  When those 
competing interests are of a nature such that their bases are found in the text 
of the Constitution, the resolution of such conflict becomes especially 
consequential.  In the conflict between the employment and equal-protection 
rights protected by antidiscrimination legislation—namely Title VII—and 
the right of a religious organization to choose who will “guide it on its way,” 
Chief Justice Roberts and the rest of the unanimous Hosanna-Tabor Court 
stated plainly that it is the First Amendment that strikes the balance, giving 
 
 238.  See supra note 226 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 239.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 240.  See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
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religious organizations the right to engage in employment practices that 
violate the statutory mandates of Title VII.241 
When the parties within the conflict change, however, the balance 
seemingly changes along with them.  The Court’s ruling in Martinez, 
upholding a university nondiscrimination policy that would withhold 
benefits from a religious student group whose religion compels them to 
violate that policy due to its eligibility requirements for members and 
leaders, effectively placed an individual’s right to inclusion within a club 
above the right of that club to operate as its religion requires.242  This 
conclusion, two years before the Court’s unanimous ruling in Hosanna-
Tabor, now seems inconsistent.  Though the two cases presented claims 
arising under differing constitutional provisions, the people and policies 
involved in those disputes are, on a very basic level, quite similar.243  Both 
involved the modern idea of combating discrimination.244  Both involved a 
religious group’s right to govern itself, free from governmental 
interference.245  And both involved the possibility of a government-issued 
penalty where a religious group acted upon that right.246      
Similar conflicts should lead to similar resolutions.  As the Court in 
Martinez submitted that “it would be anomalous for a speech restriction to 
survive constitutional review under the limited-public-forum test only to be 
invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive association,”247 
one could submit that it too is anomalous to, at the same time, allow a 
religious organization the unencumbered right to choose its leadership 
despite the mandates of a federal antidiscrimination statute while stripping a 
religious student group of that same right due to a university-enacted 
nondiscrimination policy.  Churches, religious employers, and religious 
student groups are all founded upon a message that influences how they 
operate internally and how the community in which they gather perceives 
them.248  And when it comes to ensuring the clarity and credibility of that 
 
 241.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 242.  See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 243.  See discussion supra Parts III.A–B, IV.A. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  See discussion supra Parts III.A–B, IV.A–C. 
 246.  See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
 247.  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971, 2975 (2010). 
 248.  See discussion supra Part IV.C.  
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message, the messenger matters.  It is this truth that laid the foundation for 
the construction of the ministerial exception, and it is this same truth that 
should lead to the creation of an exception to university nondiscrimination 
policies that would enable a religious student group to freely exercise its 
constitutional right to choose those who will guide it on its way. 
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